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Abstract. Democracy consolidation is a process that reduces the possibility of reversing democratization, for the process is
featured by negotiations among actors that wants to "promote" the new system or "rules of the game" rather than to damage
the old system, and everything is reflected in the process of returning to the nagari in West Sumatra, Indonesia. There is an
anomaly of power when the nature of state authority finally raises a "drama" of a political system directly applied to local nagari
institutions. The renewal of nagari from previously imposed uniformity under the Village Government Law 5/1979 cannot be
analyzed merely as an issue of autonomy and governance. It must be understood within regulative, normative, and cultural orders
that shape institutions and their actors. This study adopts a sociological and historical analysis of neo-institutionalism to examine
the political dynamics of nagari. The key problem discussed in this article is how institutional structures, rules, norms, and cultures
affect local elites and communities during the consolidation of local democracy in nagari in West Sumatra. A post-positivist
explorative method is applied as a tool to dissect and analyze problems with the aims to yield solid, conceptual, and varied
findings and data analysis. Analysis and discussion are directed to two findings: first, traditional and modern nagari government
institutions; second, consolidation process of nagari institutions in West Sumatra. Overall, the analysis and discussion of the
political and governance system of traditional and modern nagari become an interesting object study to thoroughly examine the
local democracy consolidation journey occurring in West Sumatra.
Keywords: nagari, local institution, democracy consolidation, sociological and historical analysis, neo-institutionalism
Abstrak. Tahap-tahap konsolidasi demokrasi adalah proses yang mengurangi kemungkinan membalikkan demokratisasi,
karena proses tersebut ditampilkan oleh negosiasi di antara para aktor yang ingin "mempromosikan" sistem baru atau "aturan
main" daripada merusak sistem yang lama, dan semuanya tercermin dalam proses kembali ke nagari di Sumatra Barat,
Indonesia. Ada anomali kekuasaan ketika sifat otoritas negara akhirnya memunculkan "drama" sistem politik yang secara
langsung diterapkan pada institusi nagari setempat. Pembaharuan nagari dari keseragaman yang diberlakukan sebelumnya
di bawah UU Pemerintahan Desa 5/1979 tidak dapat dianalisis hanya sebagai masalah otonomi dan pemerintahan. Ini harus
dipahami dalam tatanan regulasi, normatif, dan budaya yang membentuk institusi dan aktor mereka. Studi ini mengadopsi
analisis sosiologis dan historis dari neo-institusionalisme untuk memeriksa dinamika politik nagari. Masalah utama yang
dibahas dalam artikel ini adalah bagaimana struktur kelembagaan, aturan, norma, dan budaya mempengaruhi elit lokal dan
masyarakat selama konsolidasi demokrasi lokal di nagari di Sumatera Barat. Metode eksplorasi post-positivist diterapkan
sebagai alat untuk membedah dan menganalisis masalah dengan tujuan untuk menghasilkan temuan dan analisis data yang
solid, konseptual, dan beragam. Analisis dan diskusi diarahkan pada dua temuan: pertama, lembaga pemerintah nagari
tradisional dan modern; kedua, proses konsolidasi institusi nagari di Sumatera Barat. Secara keseluruhan, analisis dan diskusi
tentang sistem politik dan pemerintahan nagari tradisional dan modern menjadi objek studi yang menarik untuk memeriksa
secara menyeluruh perjalanan konsolidasi demokrasi lokal yang terjadi di Sumatera Barat.
Kata kunci: nagari, institusi lokal, konsolidasi demokrasi, analisis sosiologis dan historis, neo-institusionalisme

INTRODUCTION
Democracy consolidation is a process that reduces the
possibility of reversing democratization by negotiating
new "rules of the game" rather than damaging old systems. Consolidation stabilizes, internalizes, and legalizes
political structures and procedures. It establishes an operational democracy and credibility within the community
and state (Linz and Stepan, 2001; Freedman, 2006). To
analyze the consolidating of local democracy in Indonesia
is to discuss democratization and the rise of civil society
through decentralization (Nordholt and Klinken, 2007:
2). The relation between decentralization and democracy
is characterized by an increase in political participation,

institutional transparency, and dynamic regional politics
(Baswedan, 2007).
When consolidation shifts from state-centered to
society-centered, its study shifts to analyzing the many
participants in local institutions (Agustino, 2007: 144145). NGOs and civic associations assist in the maturation
of democratization (Agustino, 2007: 144). By exploring
how structures, rules, norms, and political institutions work
when they become part of a political institution (Miler,
2011: 22), this study extends the literature of democratic
consolidation at the local level.
Decentralization in Indonesia means that the central
government established local such as nagari, gampong,
desa, and subak. In Indonesia, the neo-institutional
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consolidation of democracy created problems. Among
them, shifting from centralized to decentralized government is not synonymous with shifting from authoritarian
to democratic government. Abandoning a strong state does
not necessarily form a strong civil society, nor does weakening central government automatically strengthen local
democracy (Nordholt and Klinken, 2007: 203, 224, 417).
Although institutionalization locally is inseparable from
institutions of local government (Mariana, 2008: 90-91),
no studies since Nordholt and Klinken (2007) observe
the complexity of historical and sociological analysis that
traces the changing continuities on neo-institutionalism in
Indonesian local political dynamics.
Indonesia's revival of nagari invites a structuralist
analysis of autonomy, good governance, and public service
management (Agustino, 2014: 80). It compels considering
the regulative, normative, and cultural factors that shape
political behaviors (Miller, 2011: 22). It particularly calls
for examining how institutional structures, rules, norms,
and cultures affect local elites and communities during
the consolidation of local democracy in nagari in West
Sumatra?
That consolidation triggered conflicts among central,
provincial, and district governments and elites in each
nagari. We perceive an anomaly of power when the nature
of state authority leads to a drama of political system
directly applied to local institution of nagari. An important
point to develop the process of consolidation of demoration
that occurred in the Nagari in West Sumatra by looking
at: 1) The structure of traditional and modern nagari government institutions; 2) consolidation process of nagari
institutions in West Sumatra.
Overall, the analysis and discussion of the political
and governance system at traditional nagari became an
interesting object study to thoroughly examine the local
democratic consolidation journey occurring in West
Sumatra.
RESEARCH METHOD
The study uses an explosive post-positive method.
Straus and Crobin (2009: 350) emphasize that a qualitative study will generate a conceptual and varied solid
theory by using the data source from in-depth interviews
and field observations1.
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 351) State that in a
qualitative or postpositive study, data source is similar,
namely field observation and interviews. This postpositive
method describes several effective and highly influential
procedures. The procedures are constant ratio, generative
questions, the framework of the study to solidify concepts and conceptual integration variations. According to
Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 352), in practice, postpositive
researchers view a study as a series of logically linked
stages, believing in the diversity of perspectives from
participants, supporting appropriate and meticulous data
collection and analysis methods, encouraging the use of
the approaches of validity and writing qualitative studies
in the form of scientific reports. An example of a postpositive framework according to Creswell (2014: 32) can
be seen in the systematic procedure of grounded theory.
The primary data of the study are obtained from
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in-depth interviews with related parties such as faculty members at the School of Humanities, Andalas
University, Padang, and the Head of the Institute of
Minangkabau Studies of Andalas University, Padang.
The selected informants have the ability and experience
to participate directly in the process of writing the political history of nagari. The field observation focuses on
the collection of secondary data, spread across severallibraries and the center of study and research at Andalas
University, written in the form of hard files and soft files
such as journal articles, e-journals, books, e-book, and
ancient manuscripts related to the topic of the study. In
the process of in-depth interviews, field-log is used so
that the authors can generate a general sense from the
information obtained and reflect on its meaning as a whole
before it is analyzed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Social Development toward Democratization
The scholars studying democratic consolidation give
more emphasize on democratic stabilization or deepening
democracy2, example Asrinaldi (2014) emphasizes that
the deepening of democracy does not only involve democratic structures and procedures, but even more, how the
quality and substance of democracy is meaningful to
society. Asrinaldi’s (2014) opinion is then juxtaposed with
theoretical arguments brought by Robert (1998: 19) who:
“value[s] democracy primarily as a Process of popular
empowerment- that is, as an arena for the self-constitution
of popular political subjects and the exercise of popular
sovereignty over collective decision making. The logic
of this conception leads inexorably to an emphasis on
the progressive ‘deepening’ or extension of democratic
norms and practices”
And only few discuss the quality of democracy
towards consolidation, i.e. discussing and analyzing the
role of norms and culture, as well as the community
structure in influencing the democratic consolidation.
Particularly during the last two generations, several topics
in political comparisons have generated much research
and debates in the subject of democratization and the
consolidation of democracy. A number of scholars in the
last decades can be viewed as part of the political comparative literatures that have emerged since the period of
post-second-world-war, such as Jepsen (2011: 275) who
examines subjects such as "democratic prerequisites" and
pre-conditions of democratic governance. Initial analysis
by Jepsen (2011) suggests that over the last 35 years there
have been many debates from scientists trying to explain
the cause of democratization and how a democratic government can survive in a regime. The authors attempts to
synthesize the main arguments made by those scholars
in their literature.
Initially, Schedler (1998: 91-157) asserts that the
consolidation of democracy is meant to describe a new
democracy in a country. According to him there are two
positive versions of the democratic continuum towards
consolidation: firstly, the consolidation of democracy,
i.e. the continuation of democratic transition by conducting a series of liberal-democratic electoral process;
secondly, the continuum of democracy as the creation
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of liberal deepening democracy, pushing the political
system toward the consolidation of democracy. To do
so, according to Linz and Stepan (1996), there are several criteria mostly used by some scholars to identify a
country as part of democracy, namely the enforcement
of civil and political rights, as well as competitive and
inclusive elections.
The theoretical discussion was even more interesting
when Linz and Stepan (1996), Schedler (1998), Freedman
(2006) and others coin the term democratic consolidation to describe a process that reduced the possibility of
reversal of democratization. According to them, consolidation of democracy is influenced by the process of
negotiation (transaction) that promotes a new system or
rule of the game rather than damages the old system. The
political structures and procedures that take place during
the transition process will be strengthened, internalized,
and even validated in the consolidation process. Finally,
the consolidation process will operationally lead to the
establishment of a democratic system, and will gain credibility before the public and the state.
Despite differences of opinion about the concept of
democratic consolidation, the authors attempts to avoid
partiality and try to provide a kind of literary landscape
and reinforcing findings that strengthen the arguments
on democratic consolidation.
The authors looks at the various approaches used by
some scholars on the idea of democratic consolidation
that lead to two aspects: i) the process of democratic
transition for consolidation seen from the electoral process; ii) the "continuum" of democracy by intensifyingthe
analysis of liberal democracy.
There is an ‘empty gap’ that has not been analyzed by
scholars in terms of democratic consolidation: that the
process of democratic consolidation requires the habituation of norms, cultures, and institutionalizations; the
State’s intermediation with local people is reflected in
the form of policy as a way to see democratization. In
the stage of democratic consolidation, democracy must
be well managed; there must be an institutionalization to
strengthen democratic elements. The authors takes a different perspective: a democratic country whose political
institutionalization is chaotic shall result in the country's
poor stability. One of the conditions that mitigate this
impact is the strengthening the political institutionalization and government at the local level, i.e. villages
or nagari.
Neo-institutionalism: A Socio-historical Perspective
Neo-institutionalism emerged during the mid-1990s
and became dominant in political science3. Fearing that
behaviorism would obscure analysis of institutions, political scientists began to question whether they should
ignore the traditionalist interest in institutions during
the mid-1980s (Marsh and Stoker, 2002: 42-57; Rhodes,
2006: 91:92; Ishiyama, 2011: 22-23). Consequently, postbehaviorism reclaimed political science. The underlying
reason is institutional analysis is central to the identity
of political science as a discipline. It explores how institutional structures, rules, norms, and cultures inhibit
individual choices and behaviors as they become part of
political institutions (Miller, 2011: 22). It combines the
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traditionalist's attention to rules and institutional structure with the behaviorist's interest in individual political
actors (Miller, 2011: 23).
Olsen (2001: 193) asserts that political institutions play
a more autonomous role in shaping political behavior.
He argues that examining behaviors without studying
institutional barriers yields incomplete understanding
of political realities. Rhodes et al. (2006: 3) echo that
institutional approaches permit the discovery of more
political complexity.
Marsh and Stoker (2002) note that normatively and
historically bound structures shape political behaviors.
Neo-institutionalism must not equate political institutions
and organizations since institutions are repetitive and
stable patterns of behavior. When neo-constitutionalism
is concentrated to informal habits and organizational
structures, it requires attention to how institutions establish values and power relations, since neo-institutionalism
is methodologically more drawn to theoretical models
of how institutions influence behavior instead of functioning as an inductive descriptive method to generate
conclusions.
Baswedan (2007), Schmidt (2010), and Abrutyn and
Turner (2011) identify three pillars of neo-institutionalism. The regulative pillar is comprised of institutions
that disburse reward and punishment formally (police
and court) or informally (folkways). These regulative or
rational choice institutions work through repression and
constraint, but they also empower utility-maximizing
participants. The normative pillar is the values and norms
that govern social life (Schmidt, 2010), guide participants
to define goals, and direct their achievement. Normative
institutions are related to historical institutionalism (original institutional theory). The cultural-cognitive pillar
is the assembly of social institutions formed by external
cultural frameworks. It determines how people and organizations interpret the world and behave.
Neo-institutionalism examines how institutions influence political action (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010: 18). A
subset of institutional theory—sociological neo-institutionalism—sees institutional rules, norms, and structures
as culturally constructed, not as rationally dictated. Even
bureaucratic practices must be explained in cultural contexts. The sociological institutional approach holds that
state intervention into policy creates political stability
(Amenta and Ramsey, 2010: 20). Amenta and Ramsey
(2010: 21) have difficulty distinguishing sociological from
political institutionalism. As Miller (2011: 26) notes, a
normative approach obscures boundaries between institutions and cultures.
Historical neo-institutionalism asserts that formal and
informal procedures, norms, and conventions inhabit the
structures of politics and political economy (Hall and
Taylor, 1996: 938). It differs from sociological neo-institutionalism in being a typical approach to political inquiry
(Ramsey, 2010). Historical neo-institutionalism configures interactions among political institutions, notably
central and regional institutions (Amenta and Ramsey,
2010: 2-22). Historical neo-institutionalism focuses on the
construction and adaptation of multiple institutions across
complex processes (Miller, 2011: 26). Ribot (2007: 43-49)
outlines how decentralization in developing countries
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empowers elected regional governments by transferring
power to local private institutions, customary authorities,
and non-governmental organizations. Noting examples
from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali, Mozambique, and
Indonesia, Ribot (2007) explains decentralization's promises to increase community participation in decisions
and promote local democracy. However, recent studies
document the call to restore the authority of original
local institutions rather than diffuse power among new
local institutions. Baswedan (2007) examines the effects
of policy decentralization, relations between regional
autonomy and democracy, and the design of regional
autonomy in Indonesia.
Our study differs from previous literature by adopting
a behavioral and neo-institutional perspective. It explores
how institutional structures, norms, and culture inhibit
individual choices within political institutions; however,
it also takes a post-positive perspective. It tries to understand the reversal of democracy among Indonesia's nagari
by analyzing institutions at all levels.
Sociological and Historical Institutionalism: The
Structure of Traditional and Modern Nagari
Government
Local political settings in pluralistic Indonesia were
created by local institutions and conventions that long
pre-date the Village Law in 1975 (Law 5/1979 on the
Village). On the one hand, villages (nagari, subak, gampong) are self-managing institutions descended through
generations. Managing conflict is particular to their identity. They are communities of indigenous laws that are
entitled and able to organize and manage their interests
independent from central and provincial governments.
On the other hand, they are part of the modern government bureaucracy. The effort to balance standardized
governmental functions in a unitary state and the authority of custom makes village-level governments (nagari
in West Sumatra, the Katamanggungan in Kalimantan)
"double faced" (Santoso, 2003: 240-241).
Nagaris in West Sumatra resemble tiny countries
created by the central government. They are governed
by an executive (Wali Nagari), a legislative body (the
Nagari Consultative Body (BMN/Bamus), and a judiciary
(the Nagari Customary Council (KAN) as specified by
Regional Regulation 2/2007 on Nagari Government).
Decentralization and local democratization in West
Sumatra have been polemical, starting from Law 5/1979
on Village Government4 during the 1970s, Indonesia
began to centralize laws and standardize regional governance. Law 5/1979 adopted the Java village model
throughout Indonesia. In West Sumatra, this was implemented in 1983 to Law 6/2014 on Village. The people
of West Sumatra accepted intervention from the central
government by eliminating the local political identity
and self-governing community based on nagari (Von
Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, 2007:
419-420)5. The intervention in question is the uniformity of the nagari government into village governments
under Law 5/1979, and the replacement of jorong as an
administrative territory under nagari into a village to
obtain aid funds (bandes). Interference by central and
local governments undermines nagaris by damaging
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relationships between local chiefs and communities.
Among other economic, social, and cultural effects, the
transition to villages marginalized the nagari and eliminated local identities (Von Benda-Beckmann and von
Benda-Beckmann, 2007: 422-424)6 Transforming nagari
to a village shifts power and local leadership to the village government. Village governments run the lowest
governmental functions throughout Indonesia, while the
nagari are restricted to dealing solely with customary
issues. Valentina and Putera (2010) demonstrates that
from 1979 to 1999 conditions worsened as the village
head's leadership was overtaken by the "tali tigo sapilin"
and "tigo tungku sajarangan" (i.e., ninik mamak as the
penghulu (chief), alim ulama (clerics), and cerdik pandai
(scholars) of nagari). The transition did not create a communitarian democracy in the nagari, nor has the state
provided financial compensation for village apparatuses
(Hasbi et al, 1990: 30; Naim, 1990: 48, 60).
"From the colonial period to the post-independence
period of the New Order, there has been a tendency for
the undermining and weakening process of the nagari
system" (Chairiyah, 2008: 78). nagari do not meet Weber's
definition of an institution— i.e., an entity that has a
monopoly over legitimate use of violence. Theoretically
nagaris are autonomous, self-governing communities with
a unified socio-cultural order (Von Benda-Beckmann and
von Benda-Beckmann, 1979). However, regime change
(from the New Order to Reform) revived decentralization
and local democracy, creating euphoria throughout West
Sumatra (Eko, 2003). Decentralization reversed socialpolitical boundaries. As provincial governments ceded
power7, After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia massively
renegotiated administrative, political, and social boundaries. The legislature laid the foundation for negotiation
by loosening boundaries between central and regional
governments and shifting power to lower administrative
levels, especially districts. There were two consequences:
the reorganization of village governments through Law
7/1979 and reconsideration of the Minangkabau identity
within the greater Indonesian government (Von BendaBeckmann and von Benda-Beckmann in Nordholt and
Klinken, 2007: 417-418). District governments asserted
their autonomy over provincial and central governments.
District governments defined the model of democracy for
each nagari and the boundaries of authority between the
government and indigenous communities8. Converting
territorial boundaries of villages into nagari compelled
the rural populace to redefine the village's internal relations and restore social and economic relations while
using the village as the lowest form of government. In
short, reform altered relations internally among nagari
governments, institutions, and communities and externally between the nagari and central, provincial, and
district governments within a centralized state (Eko,
2003: 257). Doing so created a problem: the state sought
to renew nagari institutions in accord with governance
reforms (Eko, 2003: 257-258), but failure exacerbated
potential for conflict with the state.
Overall, Indonesia's first democratic consolidation
created a paradox. It reversed democracy through state
dictate and gave central and local governments power to
obstruct interests of groups within the nagari. However, it
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strengthened democratic elements within the nagari (e.g.,
the bamus, KAN, and Wali Nagari). Institutionalization
that creates chaos threatens the stability of a democratic
state. One path to stability is to strengthen local political
institutions and governments, among them the village
or nagari.
Institutional analysis, in particular the work of
Amenta and Ramsey (2010), offers the best assessment
of Indonesia's actions. Its two legislative initiatives
empowered the pillars of local democratic process. The
significant revision, if examined based on institutional
theory applied to politics per, is to place two forms of
analysis: i) Judging from the influence of the institution
on the formed political policy as perceived from political
policies made by the local government for nagari9, example The formation of adat nagari in the Agam District
and direct election of Wali Nagari (Pilwana); ii) Judging
from political actions10 with The distribution of nagari
budgets of approximately RP1 billion without considering
the readiness of nagari apparatuses.
That was the case in every Nagari in West Sumatra.
as well as institutions able to limit some political actions
11
with As the judiciary KAN retains influence over all
decisions by nagari apparatuses (as in Nagari Lawang and
Nagari Tigo Balai in Agam District and Nagari Pariangan
in Tanah Datar District). Regarding the election of the
wali nagari, the first decision on who would nominate is
formulated by KAN (in Nagari Lawang and Nagari Tigo
Balai) and the Lembaga Unsur (for Nagari Pariangan).
The district government as an extension of the provincial
and central governments acknowledges the decision of
these two institutions. From the perspective of sociological neo-institutionalism, a constitutive institution will
build a model for political institutions. This is evident
in the constitutive nature of the institution that revives
society's neglected cultural structure. For example, the
amendment to Perda 9/2000 in conjunction with Perda
2/2007 on the institutional structure of nagari government, KAN is included in the structure of the nagari
government as its judiciary. In addition, under Perda
2/2007 the Wali Nagari reports to the regent without
regard for the sub-district head, his supposed superior.
We interpret Perda No. 9 in conjunction with Perda
2/2007 as a search for legitimacy through policy imitation and diffusion of institutional forms. Based on this
paradigm, there are normative approaches and cognitive
institutions such as efforts to: i) "preserve" Kerapatan
Adat (KAN/judiciary body) that have existed since Law
5/1979 during the New Order, although according to
Shamad (2014: 5-6) a strong central political system
retains hegemony over the region as well as the factor of
elite’s commitment especially local elite behavior which
was controversial toward local culture; ii) design custom
village (desa adat) as mandated by Law 6/2014 (as conducted by the local government of Agam).
From the sociological and historical institutional
approach, the making of rules and norms by the West
Sumatra Regional Government in the form of Perda on
the nagari, and the overhaul of institutional structure
have been rationally and culturally constructed, including the change from village to nagari governments. In
the sociological neo-institutionalism of Amenta and
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Ramsey (2010: 20) state intervention in policy creates
national political stability. However, in this study, stability in regional political institutions is closer to central
intervention in the implementation of autonomy and
decentralization (Valentina and Putera, 2011: 211-219).
Consolidation Process of Nagari Institutions in West
Sumatra: A Historical Review
When regional autonomy was implemented by the central government in early 2001, many parties questioned
whether it would automatically lead to fundamental and
structural paradigm changes. With regional autonomy, it
is expected that there will be a paradigm shift from centralization to decentralization, from a guided culture to
emphasizing the principles of democracy, initiatives and
aspirations of regional people. Structural changes that are
worth noting from Law 22/1999 which was later renewed
into Law 32/2004 and in 2014 was revised again into Law
23/2014 concerning Regional Government, is the desire
to realize the implementation of regional autonomy as a
whole and widely in districts and cities, while provinces
only have limited autonomy.
How is the nagari? Year of Politics, that's the term that
is often described in seeing local democracy (Nagari) in
West Sumatra when it entered the early years of 2000
and is the beginning of the process of consolidating local
democracy. The prospect of returning to nagari, turned
out to lead to political discussions concerning two problems that are often mixed up. The first problem is about
the territorial base for the village (read: new nagari), and
the second concerns the organizational model to which
the nagari must be returned, whether the pre-colonial,
colonial, Old Order, or New Order models.
There were two groups formed when the discussion
revolved around returning to this nagari, the first group
were optimists, namely traditional leaders who insisted
that returning to nagari would solve all the problems
that had been faced by the village, this group hoped that
respect would grow for the adat and the adat leaders in
the nagari government will be formed, and this group will
come from LKAAM12 (Interview with Buspadewar Dt.
Kayo, Ketua LKAAM Kubuang Tigo Baleh, Kecamatan
Kubung, Kabupaten Solok). The second group came
from skeptical voices, urban and rural intellectuals who
were afraid of losing their positions while still in the
village were13 (Interview with Buspadewar Dt. Kayo,
Ketua LKAAM Kubuang Tigo Baleh, and The researcher
crossed the check again with the reorganizing team with
nagari in West Sumatra namely Rusdi Lubis and Hasan
Basri.).
As expressed by Rusdi Lubis in an interview stated:
"In fact, this situation is feared that the loss of functional positions is a group of elites who refuse to return
to this religion, which during this time when their villages got a strategic position. Another reason is the lack
of financial resources that support the conflict of interest between indigenous groups (KAN) and the Village
Head".
Likewise, what was revealed by Hasan Basri in the
interview explained:
"In the view of groups who refuse to return to nagari,
the return of traditional leaders in the nagari government
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is not one good solution to returning to the nagari now,
and this is what should be considered as to how the model
returns to nagari".
The phenomenon of the emergence of the "ambition"
of the ruler must be based on the lineage of the adat
group (read: the head), resulting in local politics in nagari
understood as the result of a combination of centralized
political pressures and demands of centripetal political
pressure for post-New Order decentralization. Although
in the early days the institutionalization of decentralization this pattern has not been clearly seen, but the desire
to revive the oligarchy of power of customary leaders to
return to the spirit of romanticism in the model of the
nagari political structure in pre-colonial times is increasingly clearly visible.
Back to Nagari in West Sumatra, will you consider the
culture and segmentation of local communities that are
the source of political legitimacy? This is what is feared
by the political policy makers about returning to Nagari
in West Sumatra after long intervening with the New
Order's authoritarian political system14 (Interview with
Sutoro Eko in Yogyakarta). Diamond, Linz, andLipset
(1990) n fact, it has explained the work of the "cultural"
force - for example kinship - will result in pseudo democracy15. Pseudo-democracy what is meant is Nagari/
Village/Gampong/Subak/Marga, is only a legal subject.
Although Nagari/Village/Gampong/Subak/Marga are
customary law community units, only a portion of the
Ministry of Home Affairs element views Nagari/Village/
Gampong/Subak/Marga as a whole and recognizes them
as legal subjects. Other ministries such as the Ministry
of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Public Works
(PU), and Bappenas, do not use the terms Nagari/Village/
Gampong/Subak/Marga, but use rural and specifically
rural development. Then the paradigm of "country
building villages" emerged. As a critical note from the
results of research by IRE and Tifa Foundation (2006)
published two books entitled Rich in Poor Policy Projects
and Dismantling the Failure of Village Development
and Development that Marginalized the Village, exemplifying Bali. When the local wisdom and traditional
government structure of Bali prioritizes cooperation and
consensus and balance which ultimately provides a strong
foundation for village development, what happens instead
is that development decisions originating from outside the
village create problems and local development initiatives
and cause conflicts within them.
In this logic, the existence of formal democratic political institutions such as Nagari, Gampong, Marga and
others will result in the domination of power becoming
invisible (Dwipayana, 2003: 6, 154). David Held (2007)
also explained, even though many countries currently
adhere to democratic ideals, actually the political history
of the country reveals fragility and vulnerability in terms
of democratic order.
The middle ground that researchers take for the above
question is that democratization generally includes several processes or stages, namely liberalization, transition,
installation and consolidation, with the expansion of the
meaning of democracy finally bringing the topic of analysis of scientists to "consolidating democracy." According
to Singh (2014: 10) when discussing and analyzing the
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consolidation of democracy scientists cannot ignore the
importance of political structures at the macro level.
The meaning is that democratic consolidation is usually
characterized by understanding and commitment among
elite groups to implement democracy.
Based on empirical analysis, researchers about the
process of consolidating local democracy in nagari, renagari which is formulated is a transition from "order"
to "disorder", namely the changing continuities of the old
elite rulers (in this case researchers see it to the traditional
rulers who do not get a place when nagari turns into a
village) against local government institutions that will be
formed (return to nagari). Although decentralization will
not automatically result in local democracy, it will give
birth to past sustainability but the researchers see a different analysis when combining several empirical records
related to the consolidation of nagari's democracy. There
are social values and political culture as a consequence
of the emergence of the arena of democracy which is a
condition for the consolidation of democracy that can be
further elaborated, to see the process of consolidating
nagari's local democracy
Decentralization and returning to nagari in the form
of a process of consolidating local democracy, more
than just talking about geographical reconfiguration
and administration. There is considerable differentiation between the provincial and district governments in
realizing this concept of re-nagari. Besides talking about
social boundaries, again nagari also discussed local elites
involved, and how the customary law community unit
was associated with cultural identity that had long been
embedded in Minangkabau society based on the political
system of the aristocratic Koto Piliang and egalitarian
Bodi Chaniago. Nagari is thus becoming more complex
social and political communities with diverse government structures.
Talking about nagari turns out to contain two problems, namely the relationship between nagari and the
state and the relationship between nagari and the community. How the internal political system in nagari
processes in the consolidation of democracy is not seen
in the tradition of society, but is better seen in the tradition of its community. The renewal of the nagari by
showing the romanticism of the past was too excessive,
in fact what happened was the re-creation of the nagari,
because the structure of the nagari was no longer like a
"small republic" in the pre-colonial and colonial times.
The format of the nagari has now changed following
new thoughts and spirit and changes based on the periodization of the ruling regime. The arrangements and
regulations made by the state make nagari and nagari
government rich in the dynamics of democracy, and all
according to researchers lead to one goal, which is to
achieve democratic consolidation. Although not perfect,
the re-creation of nagari and nagari government from the
period 2000-2015 has aroused new enthusiasm, namely
the growth of revitalization of local identity, and communal democracy in the Minangkabau.
Democracy that is built is a participatory communal based democracy which is believed to be a genuine
democratic tradition of the Minangkabau people, which
is far superior to the aristocratic-style democracy in
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Java. Regardless of which democratic model is used,
furthermore there is actually a meaningful meaning
of the local-based nagari renewal strategy that can be
formulated namely: i) clear authorization to nagari and
nagari government; ii) the creation of a strong institutional strategy both at the community level and at the
nagari government institution. Strong institutional presence of the nagari will have implications for the seeding
and adoption of local democracy.
CONCLUSION
There are several reasons for designing a democratized
nagari model, starting with two reasons for the return of
the nagari, namely: i) Sociologically and philosophically
and Institutionalisation, nagari lies in the uniqueness of
the Minangkabau people who are genetically adhering to
the matrilineal system, with two forms of political system
The Koto Piliang's aristocracy and the egalitarian Bodi
Chaniago and Lareh Nan Panjang (Kubuang Tigo Baleh);
ii) juridical reasons, the basis of the argument that should
be used in strengthening the legitimacy of the desire to
return to nagari is the 1945 Constitution (IV Amendment),
Article 18 along with its explanation.
The process, the transition to democracy towards the
consolidation of nagari democracy, made the face of hegemony transform into an egalitarian in exercising its power.
Although this is a strategy to "tame the people" of West
Sumatra, to participate in the rules of the game made by
the central and regional governments. But, back in nagari
by looking at the democratic process that accompanies
his journey, participation and local wisdom is a goal to
strengthen the cultural symbols of the nagari, namely
adat basandi syara’and syara’ basandi kitabullah and
adat salingka nagari.
ENDNOTES
1
Straus and Crobin (as cited by Denzin and Lincoln,
2000: 351) state that in a qualitative or postpositive
study, data source is similar, namely field observation
and interviews. This postpositive method describes
several effective and highly influential procedures. The
procedures are constant ratio, generative questions, the
framework of the study to solidify concepts and conceptual integration variations. According to Denzin and
Lincoln (2000: 352), in practice, postpositive researchers
view a study as a series of logically linked stages, believing in the diversity of perspectives from participants,
supporting appropriate and meticulous data collection and
analysis methods, encouraging the use of the approaches
of validity and writing qualitative studies in the form of
scientific reports. An example of a post-positive framework according to Creswell (2014: 32) can be seen in the
systematic procedure of grounded theory.
2
Interestingly Asrinaldi (2014) emphasizes that the
deepening of democracy does not only involve democratic structures and procedures, but even more, how
the quality and substance of democracy is meaningful to
society. Asrinaldi’s (2014) opinion is then juxtaposed with
theoretical arguments brought by Robert (1998: 19) who:
“value[s] democracy primarily as a Process of popular

7

empowerment- that is, as an arena for the self-constitution
of popular political subjects and the exercise of popular
sovereignty over collective decision making. The logic
of this conception leads inexorably to an emphasis on
the progressive ‘deepening’ or extension of democratic
norms and practices”
3
Fearing that behavioralism would obscure analysis of
institutions, political scientists began to question whether
they should ignore the traditionalist interest in institutions during the mid-1980s (Marsh and Stoker, 2002:
42-57; Rhodes, 2006: 91-92; Ishiyama, 2011: 22-23).
Consequently, post-behaviorism reclaimed political science. The underlying reason is institutional analysis is
central to the identity of political science as a discipline.
4
During the 1970s, Indonesia began to centralize
laws and standardize regional governance. Law 5/1979
adopted the Java village model throughout Indonesia. In
West Sumatra, this was implemented in 1983.
5
The intervention in question is the uniformity of the
nagari government into village governments under Law
5/1979, and the replacement of jorong as an administrative territory under nagari into a village to obtain aid
funds (bandes).
6
Transforming nagari to a village shifts power and
local leadership to the village government. Village
governments run the lowest governmental functions
throughout Indonesia, while the nagari are restricted to
dealing solely with customary issues.
7
After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia massively renegotiated administrative, political, and social boundaries.
The legislature laid the foundation for negotiation by
loosening boundaries between central and regional governments and shifting power to lower administrative
levels, especially districts. There were two consequences:
the reorganization of village governments through Law
7/1979 and reconsideration of the Minangkabau identity
within the greater Indonesian government (Von BendaBeckmann and von Benda-Beckmann in Nordholt and
Klinken, 2007: 417-418).
8
Converting territorial boundaries of villages into
nagari compelled the rural populace to redefine the village's internal relations and restore social and economic
relations while using the village as the lowest form of
government.
9
The formation of adat nagari in the Agam District and
direct election of Wali Nagari (Pilwana).
10
The distribution of nagari budgets of approximately
RP1 billion without considering the readiness of nagari
apparatuses. That was the case in every Nagari in West
Sumatra.
11
As the judiciary KAN retains influence over all decisions by nagari apparatuses (as in Nagari Lawang and
Nagari Tigo Balai in Agam District and Nagari Pariangan
in Tanah Datar District). Regarding the election of the
wali nagari, the first decision on who would nominate is
formulated by KAN (in Nagari Lawang and Nagari Tigo
Balai) and the Lembaga Unsur (for Nagari Pariangan).
The district government as an extension of the provincial
and central governments acknowledges the decision of
these two institutions.
12
Interview with Buspadewar Dt. Kayo, Ketua
LKAAM Kubuang Tigo Baleh, Kecamatan Kubung,
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Kabupaten Solok.
13
Interview with Buspadewar Dt. Kayo, Ketua LKAAM
Kubuang Tigo Baleh, and The researcher crossed the check
again with the reorganizing team with Nagari in West
Sumatra namely Rusdi Lubis and Hasan Basri.
14
Interview with Sutoro Eko in Yogyakarta
15
Nagari/village/Gampong/Subak/Marga is only a
legal subject. Although Nagari/village/Gampong/Subak/
Marga are customary law community units, only a portion
of the Ministry of Home Affairs element views Nagari/
village/Gampong/Subak /Marga as a whole and recognizes them as legal subjects. Other ministries such as the
Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Public
Works (PU), and Bappenas, do not use the terms Nagari/
village/Gampong/Subak/Marga, but use rural and specifically rural development. Then the paradigm of "country
building villages" emerged. As a critical note from the
results of research by IRE and Tifa Foundation (2006)
published two books entitled Rich in Poor Policy Projects
and Dismantling the Failure of Village Development and
Development that Marginalized the Village, exemplifying
Bali. When the local wisdom and traditional government
structure of Bali prioritizes cooperation and consensus
and balance which ultimately provides a strong foundation for village development, what happens instead is
that development decisions originating from outside the
village create problems and local development initiatives
and cause conflicts within them.
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